China and the United States after the crises:  a zero-sum battle for jobs and growth? by Schwartz, Herman
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au Page 1 of 1 
CUSAPS Working paper series No. 103 / 2012 
Presented at the CUSAPS Conference titled “The Rules of the Game in a Rising Asia” 
26 October 2012, held at the Science Exchange Centre, Adelaide 
China and the United States after the crisis:  a zerio-sum battle for 
jobs and growth? 
Herman Schwartz, University of Virginia, Charlottesville 
CUSAPS is located within the School of International Studies 
Schwartz	  –	  CUSAP	  –	  p.	  1	  /	  30	  
Herman	  Schwartz	  
Politics	  Department	  
PO	  Box	  400787	  
University	  of	  Virginia	  
Charlottesville,	  VA	  22904-­‐4787	  




Herman	  Schwartz	  is	  a	  Professor	  in	  the	  Politics	  Department,	  University	  of	  Virginia,	  USA.	  His	  
research	  focuses	  on	  economic	  development,	  change	  in	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  global	  capital	  flows.	  
Publications	  include	  Subprime	  Nation:	  American	  Power,	  Global	  Capital	  Flows	  and	  the	  Housing	  Bubble,	  
States	  versus	  Markets,	  and	  In	  the	  Dominions	  of	  Debt,	  three	  co-­‐edited	  volumes,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Housing	  
Booms	  and	  Busts	  with	  Leonard	  Seabrooke,	  Crisis,	  Miracles	  and	  Beyond	  with	  Erik	  Albæk,	  Leslie	  Eliason	  
and	  Asbjørn	  Sonne	  Nørgaard,	  and	  Employment	  Miracles	  with	  Uwe	  Becker,	  and	  over	  40	  articles	  and	  
chapters.	  
(Website:	  http://www.people.virginia.edu/~hms2f)	  
NO	  CITATION	  OR	  QUOTATION	  WITH	  AUTHOR	  PERMISSION,	  ©	  2012	  
Word	  count:	  	  c.	  7870	  
Schwartz	  –	  CUSAP	  –	  p.	  2	  /	  30	  
Abstract:	  	  Up	  until	  about	  2005,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  had	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  with	  
respect	  to	  growth	  and	  employment.	  China	  exported	  exceedingly	  cheap	  labor-­‐intense	  goods	  to	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  the	  world,	  and	  recycled	  its	  trade	  surpluses	  as	  credit	  to	  the	  American	  consumers	  
buying	  those	  goods.	  Politically,	  cheap	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  lending	  enabled	  a	  job	  creating	  housing	  boom	  
that	  ameliorated	  the	  increasingly	  unequal	  US	  income	  distribution.	  Equally	  so,	  exports	  generated	  political	  
quiescence	  in	  China	  through	  expanded	  employment.	  Together,	  US	  and	  Chinese	  growth	  helped	  Germany,	  
and	  thus	  Europe,	  grow.	  After	  2005,	  China’s	  growth	  became	  more	  capital	  intense	  and	  US	  homebuyers	  
faced	  housing	  prices	  –	  and	  debt	  levels	  –	  completely	  detached	  from	  any	  plausible	  economic	  future.	  
Relatively	  more	  capital	  intense	  Chinese	  exports	  also	  eroded	  US	  medium	  technology	  manufacturing	  in	  
the	  US	  industrial	  heartland,	  rather	  than	  just	  labor	  intense	  manufacturing	  in	  the	  US	  internal	  periphery.	  
Rising	  capital	  intensity	  also	  lowered	  employment	  growth	  inside	  China.	  This	  changed	  the	  symbiotic	  
relationship	  into	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  relationship,	  with	  Europe	  as	  the	  first	  victim.	  The	  paper	  presents	  cooperative	  
and	  conflictual	  scenarios	  for	  the	  end	  game	  over	  the	  next	  decade.	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China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  after	  the	  crisis:	  	  A	  zero-­‐sum	  battle	  for	  jobs	  and	  growth?	  
	  
Once	  you	  start	  issuing	  $	  1	  -­‐	  $	  2	  trillion	  (of	  US	  government	  bonds)…	  we	  know	  the	  dollar	  is	  going	  
to	  depreciate,	  so	  we	  hate	  you	  guys,	  but	  there	  is	  nothing	  much	  we	  can	  do.	  
Chinese	  Finance	  Ministry	  official,	  20091	  	  
	  
Mao	  Zedong	  famously	  said	  that	  political	  power	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  barrel	  of	  a	  gun.	  But	  how	  to	  pay	  
for	  that	  gun?	  The	  financial	  crisis	  starting	  in	  2007	  drove	  the	  official	  US	  unemployment	  rate	  to	  levels	  that	  
had	  not	  been	  seen	  since	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Meanwhile	  China’s	  economy,	  courtesy	  of	  a	  massive	  Keynesian	  
stimulus,	  powered	  on	  with	  near	  double	  digit	  growth.	  These	  diverging	  trends	  provoked	  fears	  of	  terminal	  
US	  decline	  that	  echoed	  similar	  fears	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  when	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  also	  out-­‐grew	  the	  
United	  States.	  Equally	  so,	  China	  reveled	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  schadenfreude	  that	  Japan	  briefly	  enjoyed	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Are	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  locked	  into	  a	  zero	  sum	  conflict	  for	  employment	  and	  
growth	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  great	  recession?	  Does	  this	  conflict	  inevitably	  end	  with	  a	  margin	  call	  from	  
Chinese	  bankers	  to	  an	  indebted	  United	  States?	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  is	  China	  destined	  for	  continued	  high	  
speed	  growth	  and	  export	  success?	  
Up	  until	  about	  2005,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  had	  a	  positive	  sum,	  symbiotic	  –	  indeed	  “co-­‐
dependent”	  in	  the	  pop	  psychological	  sense	  –	  relationship	  with	  respect	  to	  growth	  and	  employment.	  
China	  exported	  exceedingly	  cheap	  labor-­‐intense	  goods	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  world,	  and	  recycled	  
its	  trade	  surpluses	  as	  credit	  to	  the	  American	  consumers	  buying	  those	  goods.	  Cheap	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  
lending	  helped	  paper	  over	  an	  increasingly	  unequal	  income	  distribution	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	  enabling	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Luo	  Ping,	  director-­‐general	  at	  the	  China	  Banking	  Regulatory	  Commission,	  quoted	  in	  Henny	  Sender,	  “China	  
to	  Stick	  with	  US	  Bonds,”	  Financial	  Times,	  12	  October	  2009,	  accessed	  12	  October	  2009,	  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a403d716-­‐f8a6-­‐11dd-­‐aae8-­‐000077b07658.html.	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job	  creating	  housing	  boom.2	  But	  from	  2005	  onward,	  China’s	  growth	  became	  more	  capital	  intense	  and	  US	  
homebuyers	  faced	  a	  market	  whose	  prices,	  and	  thus	  mortgage	  debts,	  were	  completely	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  
any	  plausible	  economic	  future	  in	  which	  housing	  debt	  could	  be	  repaid.	  Relatively	  more	  capital	  intense	  
Chinese	  exports	  also	  eroded	  medium	  technology	  manufacturing	  in	  the	  US	  industrial	  heartland,	  rather	  
than	  just	  labor	  intense	  manufacturing	  in	  the	  US	  internal	  periphery.	  The	  US-­‐China	  relationship	  became	  
zero-­‐sum	  rather	  than	  positive	  sum.	  What	  caused	  this	  change	  and	  what	  lies	  ahead?	  
This	  paper	  answers	  these	  questions	  in	  four	  steps.	  Part	  one	  discusses	  the	  incomplete	  and	  
misleading	  conventional	  wisdom	  on	  the	  US-­‐China	  relationship,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  unbalanced	  
bilateral	  US-­‐Chinese	  balance	  sheet.	  Part	  two	  discusses	  the	  co-­‐dependent	  growth	  dynamic	  prevailing	  
from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  until	  2005,	  presenting	  a	  stylized	  model	  of	  growth	  for	  each	  country.	  Part	  three	  shows	  
how	  co-­‐dependent	  growth	  created	  internal	  contradictions	  that	  shifted	  these	  growth	  models	  into	  
something	  closer	  to	  a	  zero	  sum	  relationship	  after	  2007.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  contradiction	  emerged	  from	  
the	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  the	  US	  and	  China.	  Part	  four	  discusses	  the	  current	  state	  of	  play,	  
asking	  which	  country	  has	  a	  more	  decisive	  final	  move.	  This	  section	  is	  necessarily	  speculative,	  but	  suggests	  
that	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  a	  debtor	  and	  deficit	  country	  in	  relation	  to	  China,	  not	  only	  retains	  a	  decisive	  
power	  to	  make	  the	  last	  move	  in	  any	  economic	  conflict	  but	  has	  made	  tentative	  steps	  towards	  exercising	  
that	  option.	  This	  is	  why	  part	  one	  finds	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  wanting.	  
1:	  Chinese	  bankers,	  American	  debtors	  	  
On	  10	  October	  2010,	  the	  conservative	  pressure	  group	  Citizens	  Against	  Government	  Waste	  
released	  a	  video	  ad	  titled	  “Chinese	  Professor”	  that	  instantly	  went	  viral	  on	  youtube.com.3	  The	  ad	  showed	  
a	  Chinese	  professor	  in	  2030	  explaining	  the	  decline	  and	  fall	  of	  a	  series	  of	  empires.	  The	  United	  States,	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Herman	  Schwartz,	  Subprime	  Nation:	  American	  Power,	  Global	  Capital	  and	  the	  Housing	  Bubble	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2009).	  
3	  The	  video	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTSQozWP-­‐rM.	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said,	  had	  crippled	  itself	  by	  trying	  to	  tax	  and	  spend	  itself	  out	  of	  a	  great	  recession.	  The	  video	  ends,	  “Of	  
course	  we	  owned	  all	  their	  debt,	  so	  now	  they	  work	  for	  us.”	  Putting	  aside	  its	  partisan	  animus,	  the	  video	  
captures	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  on	  the	  US-­‐China	  relationship	  c.	  2010.	  This	  wisdom	  
rested	  on	  the	  following	  claims.	  China’s	  massive	  holdings	  of	  US	  Treasury,	  Agency	  and	  private	  debt	  put	  
China’s	  hand	  around	  America’s	  throat.	  Having	  underwritten	  US	  fiscal	  and	  trade	  deficits	  for	  years,	  China	  
now	  had	  a	  geo-­‐political	  lever	  to	  move	  the	  heretofore	  immoveable	  American	  earth.	  
And	  indeed,	  a	  forensic	  analysis	  of	  the	  cumulative	  US	  trade	  deficit	  on	  goods	  from	  1999	  to	  2010	  
shows	  that	  roughly	  29	  percent	  –	  or	  nearly	  $2.1	  trillion	  –	  of	  the	  cumulative	  $7.3	  trillion	  US	  deficit	  accrued	  
to	  China.4	  Furthermore,	  China	  accounted	  for	  18	  percent	  of	  all	  current	  account	  outflows	  attributable	  to	  
income	  payments	  on	  government	  debt,	  although	  only	  5	  percent	  of	  all	  income	  outflows.	  This	  bilateral	  
trade	  deficit	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  roughly	  $2	  trillion	  of	  various	  US	  debt	  instruments	  the	  Chinese	  state	  held	  
as	  of	  June	  2010.	  Even	  without	  adding	  in	  Hong	  Kong’s	  holdings	  –	  and	  they	  should	  be	  added	  in	  –	  China’s	  
holdings	  are	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  the	  size	  of	  its	  economy	  relative	  to	  the	  world	  economy,	  the	  US	  
economy,	  or	  indeed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  developed	  economies.	  On	  a	  net	  basis	  this	  would	  be	  even	  more	  
evident.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  gross	  holdings	  of	  US	  foreign	  debt	  and	  equities	  by	  country	  (excluding	  tax	  havens	  
but	  including	  Switzerland)	  as	  of	  2010.	  	  Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  same	  data	  relative	  to	  shares	  of	  global	  GDP.	  
But	  do	  these	  holdings	  convey	  power?	  Are	  Americans,	  as	  a	  US	  Senator,	  Jim	  Demint	  (R-­‐SC),	  
charmingly	  put	  it,	  “on	  our	  knees	  in	  front	  of	  China	  for	  credit”?	  A	  similar	  debate	  erupted	  over	  what	  were	  
then	  perceived	  as	  outsized	  Japanese	  holdings	  of	  US	  Treasury	  and	  other	  debt	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  
Then,	  as	  now,	  two	  distinct	  lines	  of	  argument	  emerged,	  one	  based	  on	  stocks	  and	  one	  based	  on	  flows.	  
First,	  critics	  argued	  that	  Japan	  or	  China	  might	  make	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  reduce	  their	  stock	  of	  Treasury	  
Bonds	  by	  selling	  significant	  portion	  of	  those	  holdings.	  This	  would	  drive	  down	  the	  value	  of	  the	  dollar	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  All	  data	  in	  this	  paragraph	  are	  author’s	  calculations	  from	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis	  data	  at	  
http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm,	  downloaded	  10	  February	  2011	  and	  US	  Treasury	  TIC	  data	  at	  
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-­‐center/data-­‐chart-­‐center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx,	  downloaded	  15	  September	  2011.	  
Schwartz	  –	  CUSAP	  –	  p.	  6	  /	  30	  
	  
the	  extent	  that	  either	  seller	  swapped	  proceeds	  into	  other	  currencies.	  It	  would	  also	  drive	  down	  the	  value	  
of	  US	  Treasuries	  and	  related	  securities.	  As	  former	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Larry	  Summers	  noted,	  these	  kinds	  
of	  sales	  would	  be	  much	  like	  a	  nuclear	  exchange,	  inflicting	  unacceptable	  levels	  of	  damage	  on	  both	  sides.	  
While	  massive	  sales	  would	  damage	  the	  creditworthiness	  of	  the	  US	  government,	  they	  would	  also	  destroy	  
the	  balance	  sheet	  of	  the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  China	  (PBoC),	  China’s	  central	  bank.	  US	  Treasury	  and	  other	  US	  
government	  bonds	  are	  the	  assets	  on	  the	  PBoC’s	  balance	  sheet	  that	  match	  its	  equally	  large	  renminbi	  
denominated	  liabilities.	  Panic	  selling	  of	  Treasuries	  that	  drove	  down	  both	  the	  dollar	  relative	  to	  the	  
renminbi,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  market	  price	  for	  those	  Treasuries,	  would	  leave	  the	  PBoC	  with	  a	  huge	  
uncompensated	  liability.	  Indeed,	  it	  would	  require	  a	  recapitalization	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  roughly	  












Figure	  1:	  Gross	  holdings	  of	  US	  foreign	  debt	  and	  
equiFes	  by	  top	  11	  countries,	  2010,	  $	  billions	  
source:	  author's	  calculaFons	  from	  TIC	  data	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Second,	  in	  a	  much	  more	  likely	  scenario,	  critics	  alleged	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  Japanese	  or	  Chinese	  
Treasury	  bond	  purchases	  made	  them	  the	  marginal	  buyer	  of	  Treasuries.	  On	  a	  flow	  basis,	  then,	  China’s	  
purchases	  might	  give	  it	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  interest	  rate	  on	  new	  issues	  of	  government	  debt.	  
Chinese	  abstention	  from	  bond	  auctions	  would	  reduce	  demand	  relative	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  new	  debt,	  
pushing	  up	  interest	  rates.	  The	  interest	  rate	  on	  US	  Treasuries	  sets	  the	  reference	  rate	  –	  the	  benchmark	  –	  
for	  interest	  rates	  on	  virtually	  all	  other	  debt	  instruments	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Thus	  rising	  interest	  rates	  on	  
Treasuries	  not	  only	  would	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  fund	  the	  federal	  deficit,	  but	  also	  would	  also	  hurt	  everyone	  
else	  attempting	  to	  fund	  consumption	  or	  investment	  by	  borrowing.	  Presumably,	  a	  sustained	  Chinese	  
absence	  from	  bond	  auctions	  could	  bring	  about	  a	  recession.	  	  
Is	  this	  argument	  plausible?	  Econometric	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  recycling	  of	  Japanese	  and	  then	  
Chinese	  trade	  surpluses	  as	  purchases	  of	  Treasury	  debt	  during	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  depressed	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as	  150	  basis	  points	  in	  2005.5	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  effect,	  albeit	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  
entirely	  clear	  that	  withdrawing	  demand	  rather	  than	  providing	  it	  would	  have	  the	  same	  effects.	  Higher	  
Treasury	  bond	  rates	  might	  well	  attract	  inflows	  of	  money	  from	  elsewhere,	  driving	  rates	  back	  down	  again.	  
Moreover,	  if	  China	  continued	  to	  run	  trade	  surpluses,	  sales	  of	  their	  excess	  dollars	  would	  probably	  flow	  
back	  to	  the	  United	  States	  as	  other	  countries’	  purchases	  of	  Treasuries	  or	  goods	  and	  services.	  Either	  of	  
these	  would	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  Chinese	  or	  Japanese	  buyer’s	  strike	  at	  bond	  auctions.	  Neither	  Japan	  
in	  the	  1980s	  nor	  China	  today	  can	  credibly	  threaten	  to	  avoid	  Treasury	  auctions	  without	  also	  taking	  steps	  
to	  reduce	  their	  trade	  surpluses.	  
This	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  one	  disrupted	  auction	  that	  did	  concentrate	  minds	  in	  Washington.	  China’s	  
refusal	  to	  buy	  more	  of	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddie	  Mac’s	  debt	  issues	  in	  2008	  was	  followed	  by	  
nationalization	  of	  the	  two	  US	  mortgage	  giants.	  Did	  China	  force	  this	  nationalization?	  Certainly	  it	  helped	  
force	  the	  Treasury	  and	  Fed’s	  hand	  in	  this	  matter,	  but	  as	  everyone	  was	  avoiding	  debt	  issued	  by	  the	  twin	  
agencies,	  the	  blame	  cannot	  be	  laid	  solely	  at	  China’s	  feet.	  Moreover,	  had	  Fannie	  and	  Freddie	  been	  
solvent,	  a	  Chinese	  buyer’s	  strike	  would	  have	  had	  effects	  much	  like	  those	  listed	  above.	  Finally,	  China’s	  
refusal	  to	  buy	  the	  Frannies’	  debt	  meant	  that	  it	  simultaneously	  increased	  its	  purchases	  of	  Treasuries.	  
If	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  about	  what	  is	  central	  to	  the	  US-­‐China	  relationship	  is	  wrong,	  what	  
then	  is	  central?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  had	  a	  co-­‐dependent	  relationship	  that	  
promoted	  growth	  in	  both	  countries	  until	  2005,	  but	  which	  then	  turned	  fratricidal.	  
2:	  Co-­‐dependent	  growth	  
From	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  until	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  each	  had	  growth	  models	  
promoting	  mutual	  growth,	  often	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  third	  parties.	  This	  mutually	  beneficial	  interlock	  
helps	  explain	  why	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  together	  accounted	  for	  45	  percent	  of	  total	  world	  growth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Francis	  E.	  Warnock	  and	  Veronica	  Cardac	  Warnock,	  “International	  Capital	  Flows	  and	  U.S.	  Interest	  Rates,”	  Federal	  
Reserve	  Bank	  International	  Finance	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  840,	  September	  2006.	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on	  a	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  basis,	  and	  their	  combined	  share	  of	  global	  GDP	  increased	  from	  32	  percent	  
to	  36	  percent,	  1995-­‐2006.6	  How	  did	  each	  growth	  model	  work?	  
2.1	  The	  US	  growth	  model	  
The	  US	  growth	  model	  had	  two	  interlocked	  virtuous	  cycles	  that	  ran	  through	  its	  housing	  finance	  
system.	  (See	  Figure	  3.)	  The	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  US	  housing	  finance	  system	  translated	  falling	  nominal	  
interest	  rates	  in	  the	  1990s	  into	  additional	  consumption	  and	  growth	  much	  more	  effectively	  than	  the	  
housing	  finance	  systems	  of	  continental	  Europe	  and	  Japan.	  The	  1990s	  were	  a	  period	  of	  profound	  
disinflation	  everywhere	  in	  the	  OECD.	  Unlike	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  long	  term	  nominal	  interest	  rates	  fell.	  
Euro-­‐area	  long	  term	  interest	  rates	  fell	  from	  11.2	  percent	  in	  1990	  to	  3.5	  percent	  by	  2005.	  US	  long	  term	  
rates	  similarly	  fell	  from	  8.7	  percent	  to	  4.0	  percent	  1990-­‐2003.7	  While	  real	  interest	  rates	  did	  not	  fall,	  
studies	  show	  that	  housing	  prices	  are	  much	  more	  sensitive	  to	  nominal	  rates	  than	  real	  rates.8	  	  
Figure	  2:	  the	  US	  Growth	  Cycle,	  1991-­‐2005	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Schwartz,	  Subprime	  Nation,	  figure	  1.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  World	  Economic	  Outlook	  Database,	  accessed	  15	  September	  2011,	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx.	  
7	  OECD,	  OECD	  Factbook,	  2005,	  http://www.sourceOECD.org.	  
8	  Richard	  Green	  and	  Susan	  Wachter,	  “The	  Housing	  Finance	  Revolution,”	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  31st	  Economic	  Policy	  
Symposium,	  Jackson	  Hole,	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  August	  2007,	  9.	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Disinflation	  potentially	  could	  have	  released	  new	  purchasing	  power	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  consumers	  
and	  companies.	  Why	  didn’t	  the	  global	  disinflation	  aided	  by	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  conservative	  
fiscal	  policy	  benefit	  all	  OECD	  economies	  equally?	  Not	  all	  debtors	  could	  use	  falling	  rates	  to	  reduce	  their	  
interest	  payments	  and	  free	  up	  cash	  for	  other	  consumption.	  Corporate	  debtors	  with	  easy	  access	  to	  bond	  
markets	  could	  refinance.	  But	  indebted	  consumers	  had	  varying	  abilities	  to	  reduce	  their	  interest	  rates	  and	  
thus	  refresh	  their	  purchasing	  power.	  Moreover,	  consumers	  in	  OECD	  different	  countries	  had	  different	  
levels	  of	  debt.	  	  
In	  the	  ideal	  case,	  the	  biggest	  Keynesian	  aggregate	  demand	  stimulus	  would	  occur	  where	  there	  
were	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  private,	  individual	  homeownership	  financed	  through	  mortgages,	  and	  the	  
financial	  system	  permitted	  cheap	  and	  easy	  refinance	  of	  those	  mortgages.	  All	  three	  conditions	  are	  true	  in	  
the	  United	  States,	  which	  has	  high	  levels	  of	  private	  homeownership,	  high	  levels	  of	  mortgage	  debt	  in	  
relation	  to	  GDP,	  and	  a	  very	  liquid	  housing	  finance	  market.	  By	  replacing	  high	  interest	  rate	  mortgages	  for	  
lower	  interest	  ones,	  American	  consumers	  freed	  up	  considerable	  purchasing	  power.	  Moreover,	  American	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homeowners	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  easily	  ‘cash	  out’	  and	  spend	  their	  home	  equity	  –	  the	  positive	  difference	  
between	  the	  home’s	  market	  value	  and	  the	  mortgage	  debt.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  refinance	  and	  home	  equity	  
extraction	  contributed	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  new	  GDP;	  from	  2000	  through	  2007	  they	  account	  for	  almost	  all	  
US	  growth.9	  
China	  (and	  Japan)	  helped	  drive	  this	  cycle	  by	  recycling	  their	  trade	  surpluses	  into	  Treasury	  bonds	  
and	  the	  Frannies’	  debt.	  The	  10	  year	  Treasury	  bond	  rate	  sets	  the	  reference	  rate	  for	  mortgages,	  so	  Asian	  
recycling	  helped	  push	  down	  mortgage	  rates	  and	  enable	  the	  refinancing-­‐into-­‐growth	  feedback	  loop	  to	  
operate.	  But	  a	  second	  feedback	  loop	  also	  connected	  disinflation	  to	  US	  growth.	  China’s	  and	  Hong	  Kong’s	  
share	  of	  US	  imports	  rose	  from	  5.7	  percent	  to	  15	  percent	  of	  total	  US	  imports,	  1991	  to	  2005.	  China’s	  low	  
wage	  labor	  provided	  an	  increasingly	  larger	  volume	  of	  low	  cost,	  imported	  consumer	  non-­‐durable	  
consumption	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  magnified	  disinflationary	  pressures.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  share	  of	  US	  
imports	  from	  high	  wage	  Japan	  shrank	  by	  almost	  the	  same	  10	  percentage	  points.10	  Finally,	  the	  Federal	  
Reserve	  Bank	  (FED)	  reinforced	  both	  trends	  by	  steadily	  lowering	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  after	  1995	  as	  
growth	  narrowed	  and	  then	  eliminated	  the	  fiscal	  deficit.	  
Politically,	  strong	  US	  growth	  and	  falling	  interest	  rates	  helped	  paper	  over	  the	  worsening	  
distribution	  of	  income	  in	  the	  United	  States	  during	  this	  period.11	  Roughly	  speaking,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
personal	  income	  increased,	  the	  top	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution,	  and	  within	  that	  the	  top	  20	  
percent	  of	  the	  top	  20	  percent	  (i.e.	  the	  top	  4	  percent),	  captured	  most	  income	  gains.	  Ever	  lower	  interest	  
rates	  allowed	  homeownership	  rates	  among	  the	  middle	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution	  to	  rise	  
despite	  stagnant	  income,	  while	  cheaper	  consumer	  non-­‐durables	  eased	  the	  burden	  for	  the	  bottom	  30	  
percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution.	  This	  debt	  fueled	  prosperity	  proved	  unsustainable,	  but	  in	  the	  medium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Alan	  Greenspan	  and	  James	  Kennedy,	  “Sources	  and	  Uses	  of	  Equity	  Extracted	  from	  Homes,”	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank,	  
FEDS	  Research	  Paper	  2007-­‐20,	  2007,	  43,	  26,	  plus	  author’s	  calculations.	  
10	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis	  data	  at	  http://www.bea.gov,	  “Table	  2b:	  US	  Trade	  in	  goods.”	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  Raghuram	  Rajan,	  Fault	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  (Princeton:	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  University	  Press,	  2010).	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run	  it	  prevented	  a	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  absolute	  income	  declines	  for	  the	  average	  male	  in	  the	  
bottom	  quarter	  of	  the	  US	  labor	  force.	  
2.2	  China’s	  growth	  cycle	  
What	  about	  China?	  China’s	  fundamental	  geo-­‐political	  and	  domestic	  political	  problems	  both	  
intersect	  around	  GDP	  growth.	  Absent	  robust	  GDP	  growth,	  China	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  transform	  roughly	  a	  
billion	  poor	  peasants	  into	  moderate	  income	  city-­‐dwellers.	  The	  Communist	  Party’s	  legitimacy	  became	  
particularly	  dependent	  on	  delivering	  growth	  after	  the	  1989	  Tiananmen	  crackdown.	  Equally	  so,	  China’s	  
external	  security	  (and	  any	  hope	  of	  recovering	  Taiwan	  Province)	  rests	  on	  transforming	  a	  backward	  
economy	  into	  an	  industrial	  powerhouse.	  Yet	  efforts	  to	  privatize	  the	  many	  small	  state	  owned	  enterprises	  
in	  pursuit	  of	  greater	  efficiency	  also	  put	  roughly	  50	  million	  additional	  workers	  back	  into	  the	  labor	  market	  
from	  1995	  to	  2004.12	  Finally,	  accumulating	  large	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  would	  limit	  potential	  
vulnerabilities	  to	  dependence	  on	  external	  raw	  materials.	  Moving	  up	  the	  value	  chain	  would	  allow	  it	  to	  
produce	  its	  own	  weapons.	  Chinese	  growth	  had	  two	  strong	  feedback	  loops	  driving	  growth	  that	  
intersected	  with	  those	  promoting	  US	  growth.	  (See	  Figure	  4.)	  
Chinese	  growth	  began	  and	  remains	  largely	  domestically	  driven.	  The	  smashing	  of	  the	  iron	  rice	  
bowl	  –	  the	  rudimentary	  welfare	  state	  that	  provided	  China’s	  citizens	  with	  pensions,	  health,	  education	  
and	  housing	  –	  created	  a	  huge	  surge	  in	  personal	  saving.	  Individuals	  and	  families	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  own	  
savings	  rather	  than	  their	  enterprise	  or	  municipality.	  Because	  China	  has	  a	  tightly	  controlled,	  state-­‐owned	  
financial	  system,	  politically	  unconnected	  households	  had	  only	  one	  option	  for	  those	  savings	  –	  bank	  
accounts	  yielding	  low	  real	  and	  nominal	  interest	  rates.	  Low	  rates	  induced	  extremely	  high	  rates	  of	  saving	  
to	  compensate	  for	  the	  slow	  accumulation	  of	  savings	  via	  compounding.	  Politically	  connected	  elites	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Yang	  Yao,	  “China	  Model	  and	  its	  Future,”	  in	  China:	  The	  Next	  20	  Years	  of	  Reform	  and	  Development,	  ed.	  Ross	  
Garnaut,	  Jane	  Golley	  and	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  Australian	  National	  University	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  2010),	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state	  firms	  could	  tap	  into	  the	  state	  owned	  banking	  system	  to	  finance	  massive	  investments	  in	  export	  
capacity.	  
But	  despite	  these	  domestic	  sources	  for	  growth,	  Chinese	  economic	  growth	  relied	  heavily	  on	  
exports	  to	  provide	  more	  than	  a	  margin	  of	  error	  in	  employment	  generation	  and	  to	  drive	  industrial	  
upgrading.	  China	  needed	  to	  generate	  about	  20	  to	  24	  million	  jobs	  per	  year	  after	  1995	  to	  keep	  
employment	  steady.	  This	  required	  GDP	  growth	  over	  7-­‐8	  percent	  per	  year.	  While	  China’s	  internal	  
economy	  was	  quite	  dynamic,	  only	  a	  robust	  export	  economy	  could	  guarantee	  rates	  this	  high,	  and	  that	  
meant	  exporting	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  By	  the	  2000s,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  absorbing	  between	  30	  and	  40	  
percent	  of	  China’s	  exports,	  and	  a	  1	  percent	  increase	  in	  US	  GDP	  predictably	  created	  a	  1	  percent	  increase	  
in	  Chinese	  GDP.	  The	  Peoples	  Bank	  of	  China,	  the	  central	  bank,	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  assuring	  that	  
exports	  continued	  to	  push	  growth	  up	  to	  politically	  necessary	  levels.	  	  
	  
	  
Schwartz	  –	  CUSAP	  –	  p.	  14	  /	  30	  
	  
China’s	  initial	  advantage	  in	  world	  markets	  was	  simply	  extremely	  low	  wages.	  Consider	  clothing,	  
where	  China’s	  share	  of	  world	  exports	  doubled	  from	  roughly	  15	  percent	  in	  1992	  to	  27	  percent	  in	  2005.13	  
In	  garment	  assembly,	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  way	  that	  a	  US	  worker	  earning	  the	  minimum	  wage	  (in	  1999	  
roughly	  $9	  per	  hour	  including	  the	  employer’s	  non-­‐wage	  costs)	  could	  compete	  with	  a	  Chinese	  worker	  
earning	  roughly	  $0.50	  per	  hour.	  US	  productivity	  was	  at	  best	  2	  times	  the	  Chinese	  level	  in	  this	  sector,	  not	  
the	  20	  times	  needed.14	  So	  a	  shift	  of	  assembly	  of	  commoditized	  garments	  out	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (and	  
Europe)	  was	  a	  certainty.	  But	  it	  was	  not	  a	  certainty	  that	  Chinese	  workers,	  rather	  than	  Bengali,	  Indonesian	  
or	  Vietnamese	  workers	  would	  be	  the	  primary	  beneficiaries	  of	  this	  shift.	  Moreover,	  going	  forward,	  the	  
Chinese	  government	  wanted	  to	  use	  export	  surpluses	  to	  upgrade	  from	  low	  skill	  products	  like	  garments	  to	  
medium	  technology	  products	  like	  machinery.	  	  
Yet	  success	  exporting	  garments	  might	  generate	  self-­‐defeating	  outcomes.	  A	  durable	  export	  
surplus	  would	  exert	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  renminbi’s	  exchange	  rate	  relative	  to	  both	  the	  dollar	  and	  the	  
currencies	  of	  rival	  Asian	  exporters.	  If	  the	  renminbi	  rose	  relative	  to	  the	  dollar	  while	  competitor	  countries’	  
currencies	  did	  not,	  then	  the	  giant	  retail	  firms	  organizing	  garment	  commodity	  chains	  would	  shift	  
production	  elsewhere.	  If	  the	  renminbi	  rose	  relative	  to	  the	  dollar,	  then	  the	  much	  larger	  productivity	  
differential	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  medium	  technology	  goods	  would	  make	  it	  pointless	  to	  extend	  a	  
production	  chain	  across	  the	  Pacific	  and	  would	  thus	  truncate	  China’s	  development	  at	  the	  level	  of	  low	  
value,	  labor	  intense	  assembly.	  
So	  China	  made	  a	  political	  decision	  to	  hold	  its	  exchange	  rate	  steady	  against	  the	  dollar	  to	  assure	  
continued	  surpluses	  and	  easier	  upgrading.	  Figure	  5	  shows	  the	  renminbi	  and	  yen	  exchange	  rates	  against	  
the	  dollar,	  on	  an	  inverted	  scale	  (a	  rising	  line	  indicates	  a	  stronger	  yen	  or	  renminbi).	  Note	  the	  relative	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stability	  of	  the	  renminbi	  from	  1995	  to	  2005.	  The	  PBoC	  created	  this	  stability	  by	  buying	  dollars	  from	  
exporters	  with	  renminbi,	  and	  then	  mopping	  up	  the	  new	  liquidity	  by	  issuing	  RMB	  denominated	  bonds.15	  
(This	  is	  how	  the	  PBoC	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  balance	  sheet	  composed	  of	  renminbi	  bonds	  as	  liabilities,	  and	  US	  
Treasury	  bonds	  as	  assets.)	  China’s	  highly	  regulated	  financial	  system	  made	  sterilization	  easier	  –	  banks	  
could	  be	  forced	  to	  buy	  PBoC	  bonds.	  But	  even	  with	  efforts	  at	  sterilization,	  the	  decision	  to	  keep	  the	  
renminbi	  fixed	  against	  the	  dollar	  reinforced	  the	  feedback	  loop	  favoring	  continued	  investment	  (indeed,	  
over-­‐investment)	  in	  exports.	  	  
First,	  even	  with	  sterilization,	  the	  liquidity	  from	  continued	  export	  surpluses	  pushed	  down	  
nominal	  and	  real	  interest	  rates	  in	  China.	  Economic	  and	  political	  imperatives	  favored	  low	  nominal	  and	  
real	  interest	  rates.	  Economically,	  low	  rates	  enabled	  higher	  rates	  of	  investment,	  and	  thus	  faster	  
industrialization.	  Politically,	  only	  state	  owned	  firms	  or	  those	  connected	  to	  party	  elites	  had	  access	  to	  
formal	  credit	  (and	  thus	  low,	  subsidized	  interest	  rates).16	  Indeed,	  one	  consequence	  of	  Tiananmen	  was	  a	  
policy	  shift	  favoring	  urban	  areas	  and	  large	  firms	  at	  the	  expanse	  of	  small	  and	  particularly	  rural	  
enterprise.17	  Cheap	  capital	  thus	  enabled	  excessive	  investment	  in	  export	  production	  capacity,	  which	  was	  
then	  validated	  by	  sales	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  And	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  made	  those	  sales	  possible,	  
closing	  the	  loop	  by	  forcing	  the	  PBoC	  to	  continue	  to	  accumulate	  dollar	  denominated	  assets	  on	  its	  balance	  
sheet	  to	  prevent	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  renminbi.	  This	  strategy	  helped	  boost.	  China’s	  share	  of	  global	  exports	  from	  
2.9	  to	  7.3	  percent,	  1995	  to	  2005.18	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Ronald	  MacKinnon,	  Exchange	  Rates	  under	  the	  East	  Asian-­‐	  Dollar	  Standard	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  University	  Press,	  
2006).	  
16	  Kellee	  Tsai,	  Back	  Alley	  Banking	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
17	  Yasheng	  Huang,	  Capitalism	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  
18	  WTO	  World	  Trade	  Database,	  http://www.wto.org.	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Figure	  5:	  Yen	  and	  Yuan	  exchange	  rate	  with	  US	  Dollar,	  1991	  to	  2010	  (inverted	  scale)	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  from	  US	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  data	  
	  
	  
Second,	  a	  fixed	  renminbi	  slowed	  Chinese	  household	  consumption	  growth,	  which	  also	  reinforced	  
the	  feedback	  loop	  favoring	  investment	  in	  exports.	  While	  Chinese	  household	  income	  rose	  absolutely,	  
household	  income	  growth	  and	  thus	  consumption	  lagged	  production	  growth	  by	  a	  consistent	  2-­‐3	  
percentage	  points	  each	  year.19	  Faced	  with	  low	  interest	  rates,	  Chinese	  households	  continued	  to	  save.	  
Meanwhile	  state	  firms	  channeled	  their	  increasing	  income	  into	  continued	  investment	  rather	  than	  
distributing	  profits	  as	  dividends.	  Household	  consumption	  declined	  from	  a	  more	  or	  less	  normal	  50	  plus	  
percent	  in	  the	  1980s	  to	  35	  percent	  in	  2009.	  The	  macro-­‐economic	  counterparts	  to	  declining	  consumption	  
were	  burgeoning	  domestic	  investment	  and	  capital	  exports	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  US	  and	  Chinese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Michael	  Pettis,	  China	  Financial	  Markets	  Blog,	  October	  16th,	  2009,	  “China’s	  September	  Data	  Suggest	  that	  the	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feedback	  loops	  intersect	  in	  this	  transfer	  of	  Chinese	  households’	  deferred	  consumption	  (manifested	  as	  
trade	  surpluses)	  to	  US	  households	  for	  immediate	  consumption.	  
3:	  The	  unraveling	  
Chinese	  and	  US	  growth	  was	  thus	  co-­‐dependent	  until	  around	  2005.	  After	  that,	  relationship	  
became	  openly	  dysfunctional.	  First,	  China	  grew	  to	  the	  point	  where	  its	  calls	  on	  world	  raw	  materials	  began	  
to	  reignite	  inflation	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Second,	  the	  PBoC’s	  continued	  sterilization	  of	  trade	  surpluses	  
induced	  Chinese	  firms	  to	  substitute	  relatively	  cheap	  capital	  for	  labor.	  Chinese	  growth	  became	  more	  
labor	  shedding	  than	  labor	  absorbing.	  Third,	  the	  increasing	  capital	  intensity	  of	  Chinese	  production	  meant	  
that	  it	  began	  to	  compete	  with	  on-­‐shore	  US	  production	  of	  medium	  technology	  goods,	  hindering	  rather	  
than	  helping	  US	  employment.	  The	  counterparts	  to	  these	  Chinese	  trends	  were	  increased	  pressure	  on	  
middle-­‐class	  expenditures	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  erosion	  of	  middle	  class	  incomes,	  and	  the	  $	  8	  trillion	  
housing	  bubble.	  All	  this	  contributed	  to	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  By	  accelerating	  each	  trend,	  the	  crisis	  has	  
simply	  exacerbated	  US-­‐China	  economic	  conflict.	  
Successful	  Chinese	  industrialization	  reversed	  part	  of	  the	  growth	  promoting	  disinflation	  dynamic	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  after	  2005.	  Given	  its	  initial	  low	  level	  of	  development,	  Chinese	  economic	  growth	  
necessarily	  involved	  greater	  and	  greater	  calls	  on	  global	  raw	  material	  supplies,	  including,	  most	  
importantly,	  oil.	  Development	  meant	  creating	  an	  entirely	  new	  infrastructure	  –	  roads,	  buildings,	  power	  
generation,	  telecommunications	  –	  and	  thus	  huge	  inputs	  of	  cement,	  steel,	  copper	  and	  energy.	  All	  told,	  
Chinese	  imports	  of	  oil,	  soybeans,	  and	  copper	  were	  about	  thirty	  times	  higher	  in	  2008	  than	  they	  were	  in	  
1995.20	  Inflationary	  pressure	  from	  raw	  materials	  prices	  forced	  the	  FED	  to	  increase	  rather	  than	  decrease	  
interest	  rates	  starting	  in	  mid-­‐2004.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Stephen	  Jen	  and	  Luca	  Bindelli,	  “AXJ	  as	  a	  Source	  of	  Global	  Disinflation	  and	  Inflation,”	  Morgan	  Stanley	  Global	  
Economic	  Forum,	  30	  November	  2007,	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Both	  rising	  prices	  and	  rising	  interest	  rates	  put	  pressure	  on	  US	  household	  budgets.	  The	  bottom	  
half	  of	  the	  US	  income	  distribution	  gets	  only	  about	  18-­‐20	  percent	  of	  total	  income,	  so	  it	  is	  income	  
constrained,	  that	  is,	  it	  already	  faces	  sharp	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  its	  consumption.	  Prices	  rose	  most	  strongly	  for	  
goods	  with	  low	  elasticity,	  in	  particular	  fuels	  and	  foods.	  While	  fuels	  account	  for	  about	  11	  percent	  of	  the	  
average	  US	  household	  budget,	  in	  the	  bottom	  half	  of	  the	  income	  distribution	  they	  amount	  to	  over	  15	  
pecent.	  Many	  of	  these	  households	  also	  had	  purchased	  housing	  using	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages	  (floating	  
or	  variable	  rate	  mortgages),	  which	  exposed	  them	  to	  rising	  interest	  rates.	  Rising	  prices	  and	  rates	  thus	  
forced	  these	  vulnerable	  households	  into	  trade-­‐offs	  among	  commuting,	  food	  or	  housing	  payments.	  	  
Second,	  Chinese	  production	  became	  increasingly	  capital	  intense	  from	  2004	  onward.	  Rising	  
wages	  partly	  drove	  this	  (see	  below).	  But	  the	  subsidization	  of	  export	  production	  and	  capital	  investment	  
that	  the	  PBoC’s	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  with	  the	  US	  Dollar	  created	  also	  drove	  this.	  By	  keeping	  the	  renminbi	  
artificially	  cheap,	  the	  PBoC	  essentially	  subsidized	  exports.	  The	  ratio	  of	  exports	  to	  GDP	  rose	  continuously	  
through	  2007,	  when	  the	  current	  account	  surplus	  peaked	  at	  10	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  By	  keeping	  domestic	  
interest	  rates	  low	  –	  which	  it	  had	  to,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  losing	  money	  on	  the	  renminbi	  bonds	  balancing	  its	  
US	  Treasury	  holdings	  –	  the	  PBoC	  encouraged	  a	  shift	  towards	  capital	  intense	  production	  methods.	  
China’s	  enterprises	  borrow	  at	  essentially	  zero	  real	  cost.	  Indeed,	  some	  argue	  that	  China’s	  state	  owned	  
enterprises	  generate	  zero	  or	  even	  large	  negative	  profits	  after	  interest	  rate	  subsidies	  equaling	  roughly	  3.8	  
percentage	  points	  (380	  basis	  points)	  are	  stripped	  out.21	  	  	  
The	  rising	  capital	  intensity	  of	  Chinese	  production	  created	  problems	  in	  China,	  by	  slowing	  the	  rate	  
of	  labor	  absorption.	  But	  it	  also	  put	  downward	  pressure	  on	  US	  incomes.	  More	  capital	  intense	  Chinese	  
production	  led	  to	  a	  substitution	  of	  local	  Chinese	  made	  components	  for	  imported	  compnents,	  and	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21Giovanni	  Ferri	  and	  Li-­‐Gang	  Liu,	  “Honor	  Thy	  Creditors	  Beforan	  Thy	  Shareholders:	  Are	  the	  Profits	  of	  Chinese	  State-­‐
Owned	  Enterprises	  Real?”	  HKIMR	  Working	  Paper	  No.16/2009	  April	  2009;	  see	  also	  the	  data	  reported	  in	  Wang	  Jing,	  
“Unirule:	  SOEs	  Register	  Negative	  Real	  Profits,”	  Caixing	  Online,	  6	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  http://english.caing.com/2011-­‐03-­‐
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displacement	  of	  US	  production	  of	  higher	  end	  consumer	  non-­‐durables	  and	  electrical	  goods	  production.	  
From	  1994/95	  to	  2005/06,	  China’s	  world	  market	  share	  of	  electrical	  goods	  exports	  went	  from	  3.1	  percent	  
to	  20.6	  percent.22	  This	  led	  to	  declining	  nominal	  income	  and	  shrinking	  industrial	  employment	  in	  the	  
bottom	  half	  of	  the	  US	  income	  distribution.	  Falling	  prices	  for	  imports	  from	  China	  had	  helped	  drive	  a	  
disinflationary	  increase	  in	  real	  consumption	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  1990s.	  But	  now	  falling	  prices	  
eroded	  incomes,	  making	  the	  price	  of	  imports	  moot	  to	  more	  and	  more	  families.	  Put	  differently,	  China	  
nearly	  doubled	  its	  share	  of	  the	  rising	  US	  non-­‐oil	  trade	  deficit	  to	  46	  percent	  between	  2000	  and	  2006.	  
Third,	  successful	  Chinese	  industrialization	  also	  boosted	  wages	  in	  China,	  reinforcing	  the	  shift	  
towards	  more	  capital	  intensive	  modes	  of	  production.	  Though	  there	  is	  some	  debate	  around	  the	  level	  of	  
processing	  in	  Chinese	  exports	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Chinese	  wages	  are	  rising,	  these	  disagreements	  
about	  rates,	  not	  trends.	  From	  2004	  onward,	  wages	  and	  benefits	  in	  Guangdong	  Province	  began	  rising	  
above	  the	  level	  of	  productivity	  growth	  –	  as	  much	  as	  20	  to	  40	  percent	  in	  2004	  alone	  –	  prompting	  an	  
exodus	  of	  labor	  intense	  firms	  into	  China’s	  interior	  and	  to	  neighboring	  Vietnam.23	  Where	  textiles	  and	  
garments	  constituted	  28	  percent	  of	  Chinese	  exports	  in	  1997,	  electronics,	  at	  35	  percent	  replaced	  them	  as	  
China’s	  largest	  export	  by	  2005.24	  Imports	  of	  components	  and	  parts	  still	  composed	  a	  growing	  share	  of	  
China’s	  machinery	  imports,	  but	  they	  fell	  in	  relation	  to	  total	  exports,	  indicating	  a	  rising	  local	  composition	  
for	  exports.	  A	  telling	  indicator	  is	  that	  per	  capita	  steel	  consumption	  in	  China	  barely	  doubled	  from	  1990	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Prema-­‐chandra	  Athukorala	  and	  Archanun	  Kohpaiboon,	  “China	  and	  East	  Asian	  Trade:	  The	  Decoupling	  Fallacy,	  
Crisis	  and	  Policy	  Challenges,”	  in	  China:	  The	  Next	  20	  Years	  of	  Reform	  and	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2000,	  but	  then	  quadrupled	  from	  2000	  to	  2010.25	  China	  was	  no	  longer	  competing	  simply	  with	  garment	  
assemblers	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  now	  was	  competing	  with	  or	  displacing	  medium	  technology	  
production	  in	  cheap	  refrigerators,	  electric	  tools	  and	  housewares.	  
Continued,	  indeed	  increasing	  Chinese	  trade	  surpluses	  after	  2005	  thus	  helped	  create	  the	  
conditions	  underlying	  the	  massive	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐2009.	  China	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  
specific	  form	  or	  depth	  of	  the	  crisis.	  These	  were	  purely	  a	  function	  of	  deregulation	  and	  non-­‐regulation	  
inside	  the	  United	  States	  that	  permitted	  financial	  firms	  to	  link	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  
together	  in	  a	  carry	  trade	  around	  housing.26	  US	  and	  European	  financial	  firms	  deliberately	  created	  a	  
maturity	  mismatch,	  hoping	  to	  profit	  from	  differences	  in	  interest	  rates	  for	  short	  term	  liabilities	  taken	  on	  
by	  the	  commercial	  finance	  part	  of	  capital	  markets	  and	  interest	  rates	  for	  long	  term	  assets	  in	  the	  subprime	  
mortgage	  market.	  They	  compounded	  this	  by	  using	  credit	  default	  swaps	  to	  insure	  against	  mortgage	  
defaults,	  thus	  also	  connecting	  the	  insurance	  sector	  to	  the	  mortgage	  market.	  China’s	  responsibility	  lay	  in	  
the	  continued	  recycling	  of	  its	  trade	  surpluses	  –	  particularly	  Chinese	  purchases	  of	  debt	  issued	  by	  Fannie	  
Mae	  and	  Freddie	  Mac.	  These	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  US	  financial	  firms	  to	  extend	  credit	  to	  the	  subprime	  
part	  of	  the	  mortgage	  market	  without	  facing	  a	  trade-­‐off	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  investment.	  
Thus	  a	  symbiotic	  set	  of	  relationships	  promoting	  growth	  turned	  fratricidal.	  China’s	  cheap	  goods	  
and	  recycled	  trade	  earnings	  helped	  push	  US	  nominal	  interest	  rates	  ever	  lower.	  Falling	  nominal	  interest	  
rates	  enabled	  US	  consumers	  to	  refinance	  their	  mortgages,	  cash	  out	  home	  equity,	  and	  continue	  both	  to	  
import	  goods	  from	  China	  and	  drive	  up	  local	  housing	  related	  employment.	  China	  meanwhile	  got	  millions	  
of	  higher	  quality	  industrial	  jobs	  and	  enough	  extra	  internal	  aggregate	  demand	  to	  transfer	  millions	  of	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people	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  employment.	  But	  by	  2005	  China	  had	  entered	  a	  capital	  intense	  growth	  path	  
that	  destroyed	  too	  much	  employment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  undermined	  Chinese	  efforts	  to	  complete	  
its	  transition	  to	  an	  urban	  economy.	  Deliberate	  manipulation	  of	  the	  dollar-­‐renminbi	  exchange	  rate	  was	  
producing	  inflation	  in	  China	  and	  depression	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
4:	  	  After	  you,	  please	  
The	  shift	  to	  a	  more	  fratricidal	  relationship	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  creates	  
considerable	  potential	  for	  conflict.	  Who	  has	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  the	  current	  relationship?	  And	  what	  about	  
third	  parties?	  Two	  things	  matter:	  the	  structural	  situation	  in	  each	  country	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  has	  the	  
last	  move.	  Structurally,	  both	  countries	  have	  extremely	  weak	  financial	  systems.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  
core	  issue	  is	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  housing	  prices	  recover	  and	  –	  almost	  the	  same	  thing	  –	  how	  fast	  banks	  
rebuild	  their	  capital.	  Recapitalized	  banks	  and	  stable	  housing	  prices	  would	  allow	  the	  FED	  to	  reel	  in	  the	  
liquidity	  it	  created	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  banks.	  	  
Put	  simply,	  FED	  intervention	  during	  the	  crisis	  boiled	  down	  to	  printing	  money	  to	  buy	  Treasury	  
bonds	  which	  could	  then	  be	  exchanged	  for	  banks’	  holdings	  of	  bad	  mortgage	  backed	  securities	  (MBS).	  By	  
March	  2010	  the	  FED	  held	  approximately	  $1.25	  trillion	  in	  MBS.	  In	  principle	  it	  could	  hold	  these	  MBS	  to	  
maturity,	  hoping	  that	  a	  steady	  revival	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  thus	  nominal	  house	  prices	  would	  allow	  
redemption	  at	  par.	  In	  practice,	  given	  that	  25	  %	  of	  all	  mortgaged	  homes	  were	  worth	  less	  than	  their	  
mortgage	  in	  2011,	  an	  orderly	  resolution	  might	  leave	  the	  counterpart	  $1.25	  trillion	  in	  excess	  liquidity	  
hanging	  around	  in	  financial	  markets	  for	  years.	  This	  $1.25	  trillion	  was	  the	  source	  of	  much	  misplaced	  
anxiety	  about	  inflation	  in	  2010-­‐2011.	  But	  misplaced	  anxiety	  can	  move	  markets,	  particularly	  in	  the	  very	  
volatile	  food	  and	  fuel	  sectors.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  by	  2011	  unemployment	  had	  been	  at	  historically	  high	  
levels	  for	  longer	  than	  any	  prior	  post-­‐1950	  recession,	  and	  the	  labor	  force	  participation	  rate	  had	  fallen	  
back	  to	  64	  %,	  a	  level	  not	  seen	  since	  1982.	  The	  longer	  people	  stay	  unemployed,	  the	  less	  likely	  that	  they	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will	  ever	  find	  employment	  again.	  A	  permanent	  drop	  in	  labor	  force	  participation	  would	  slow	  future	  
growth	  and	  wreck	  household	  balance	  sheets.	  The	  FED	  thus	  found	  itself	  trapped	  between	  too	  fast	  a	  
recovery,	  which	  might	  trigger	  an	  inflation-­‐scare	  and	  interest	  rate	  spike,	  and	  too	  slow	  a	  recovery,	  which	  
might	  lock	  millions	  of	  people	  into	  permanent	  unemployment.	  In	  this	  context,	  continued	  high	  
unemployment	  can	  only	  feed	  demands	  for	  trade	  protection.	  
In	  China	  the	  core	  issue	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  any	  effort	  to	  control	  inflation	  will	  reveal	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  banks	  hold	  non-­‐performing	  loans.	  As	  Michael	  Pettis	  bluntly	  said	  in	  a	  7	  March	  2011	  blog	  
post,	  “the	  Chinese	  banking	  system	  is	  one	  of	  the	  least	  efficient	  major	  systems	  in	  the	  world	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  assessing	  risk	  and	  allocating	  capital,	  and	  would	  be	  massively	  bankrupt	  without	  repressed	  interest	  
rates	  and	  the	  implicit	  (and	  sometimes	  explicit)	  socialization	  of	  credit	  risk.”	  The	  central	  state	  finds	  it	  hard	  
to	  control	  local	  lending,	  particularly	  after	  years	  of	  promoting	  officials	  based	  on	  their	  local	  economic	  
growth	  performance.	  Tight	  clusters	  of	  local	  bankers,	  builders	  and	  party	  officials	  have	  huge	  incentives	  to	  
develop	  real	  estate,	  infrastructure	  and	  industry	  as	  fast	  as	  possible.	  Lending	  has	  an	  economic	  basis	  –	  land	  
sales	  are	  a	  major	  source	  of	  provincial	  revenue.	  But	  the	  choice	  of	  to	  whom	  to	  lend	  and	  for	  what	  occurs	  
on	  a	  largely	  political	  rather	  than	  strictly	  economic	  basis.	  Overbuilding	  and	  overcapacity	  thus	  emerges	  
from	  inter-­‐provincial	  competition	  and	  the	  rush	  to	  enrich	  oneself	  using	  cheap	  credit.	  By	  2010	  China’s	  
provinces	  were	  building	  66	  subway	  systems	  (more	  than	  western	  Europe	  possesses)	  and	  another	  45	  
airports	  (on	  top	  of	  its	  existing	  175)	  at	  a	  time	  when	  worries	  about	  peak	  oil	  had	  already	  surfaced	  and	  
when	  130	  of	  those	  airports	  were	  already	  loss	  making.27	  	  
By	  2010,	  then,	  China	  faced	  its	  own	  version	  of	  the	  Mundell-­‐Fleming	  trilemma.	  The	  Mundell-­‐
Fleming	  trilemma	  says	  that	  countries	  can	  attain	  only	  two	  of	  the	  three	  policy	  options	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  
rates,	  free	  capital	  mobility,	  and	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy.	  China	  opts	  against	  free	  capital	  mobility,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Geoff	  Dyer,	  “China	  Plans	  Airport	  Building	  Spree,”	  Financial	  Times	  24	  February	  2011,	  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa8aa0b8-­‐4013-­‐11e0-­‐811f-­‐00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1FySc9M6o.	  
Schwartz	  –	  CUSAP	  –	  p.	  23	  /	  30	  
	  
which	  means	  that	  in	  principle	  it	  remains	  possible	  to	  use	  monetary	  policy	  to	  control	  inflation.	  As	  noted	  
above,	  though,	  keeping	  the	  renminbi	  fixed	  against	  the	  dollar	  at	  a	  point	  below	  the	  real	  rate	  of	  exchange	  
creates	  inflation	  via	  a	  rising	  trade	  surplus.	  Monetary	  policy	  is	  thus	  also	  pinned,	  as	  inflation	  is	  built	  into	  
the	  macro-­‐economy	  via	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate.	  	  
Each	  of	  China’s	  policy	  choices	  thus	  involves	  a	  politically	  painful	  decision,	  which	  encourages	  
delay.	  The	  central	  bank	  could	  raise	  interest	  rates	  sharply,	  slowing	  investment	  growth.	  But	  boosting	  
interest	  rates	  will	  put	  many	  firms	  into	  a	  negative	  cashflow	  situation	  unless	  purchasing	  power	  can	  be	  
shifted	  towards	  personal	  consumption,	  and	  that	  personal	  consumption	  absorbs	  output	  from	  the	  existing	  
excess	  capacity.	  In	  addition,	  as	  noted	  above,	  higher	  interest	  rates	  would	  also	  invert	  flows	  on	  the	  PBoC’s	  
balance	  sheet,	  causing	  it	  to	  lose	  money.	  China	  could	  free	  the	  capital	  account,	  but	  this	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  
stampede	  of	  private	  capital	  outward	  in	  search	  of	  higher	  returns	  and	  more	  secure	  property	  rights.	  Finally	  
China	  could	  break	  the	  exchange	  rate	  and	  revalue.	  Chinese	  consumers	  would	  get	  cheap	  imports,	  but	  the	  
export	  sector’s	  profits	  would	  fall.	  The	  natural	  reaction	  by	  that	  sector	  would	  be	  to	  flee	  into	  even	  more	  
capital	  intense	  production	  and	  more	  production	  for	  the	  domestic	  market.	  This	  would	  probably	  freeze	  
China	  at	  its	  current	  level	  of	  productivity	  and	  per	  capita	  income.	  
Avenues	  to	  an	  amicable	  resolution	  of	  US-­‐Chinese	  tensions	  exist.	  China	  need	  not	  use	  its	  foreign	  
currency	  reserves	  to	  purchase	  manufactured	  imports	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  Gang	  Xiao	  argues	  that	  if	  
the	  number	  of	  Chinese	  students	  studying	  abroad	  continues	  to	  grow	  at	  its	  current	  8	  %	  per	  year,	  this	  
would	  absorb	  30	  percent	  of	  China’s	  current	  reserve	  holdings.28	  This	  would	  simultaneously	  remove	  
exchange	  rate	  risk	  from	  the	  PBoC	  balance	  sheet,	  upgrade	  Chinese	  human	  capital,	  and	  maintain	  
employment	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  sectors	  in	  the	  US	  economy.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  optimistic	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scenario	  probably	  requires	  both	  sides	  to	  be	  more	  rational	  and	  willing	  to	  confront	  their	  own	  local	  elites	  
than	  they	  have	  in	  the	  past.	  
A	  steady	  revaluation	  of	  the	  renminbi	  against	  the	  dollar	  is	  probably	  the	  safest	  way	  for	  both	  
countries	  to	  achieve	  balance.	  This	  seems	  unlikely	  given	  the	  distribution	  of	  political	  power	  in	  China.	  But	  
the	  United	  States	  essentially	  has	  the	  last	  move	  for	  two	  related	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  United	  States	  
possesses	  not	  just	  a	  reserve	  currency,	  but	  the	  reserve	  currency.	  Second,	  in	  the	  bilateral	  US-­‐China	  
relationship	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  deficit	  and	  debtor	  country.	  While	  this	  is	  problematic,	  in	  an	  
economic	  conflict	  it	  means	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  less	  to	  lose	  in	  employment	  and	  growth	  terms	  from	  
escalating	  trade	  tensions.	  	  
If	  trade	  tensions	  result	  in	  fewer	  US	  imports	  from	  China,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  most	  likely	  
experience	  a	  revival	  of	  local	  production.	  While	  many	  Chinese	  imports	  could	  not	  be	  replaced	  with	  local	  
US	  production,	  the	  countries	  that	  would	  replace	  China	  as	  the	  source	  of	  US	  consumer	  non-­‐durables	  all	  
have	  more	  modest	  ambitions	  regarding	  their	  industrial	  future.	  These	  countries	  are	  less	  likely	  or	  able	  to	  
sterilize	  trade	  surpluses	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  global	  market	  share	  once	  China	  is	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  trade	  
equation.	  Instead,	  their	  surpluses	  would	  return	  to	  the	  United	  States	  as	  purchases	  of	  US	  made	  capital	  
goods	  and	  infrastructure	  equipment.	  Increased	  imports	  from	  Mexico,	  for	  example,	  generate	  relatively	  
more	  US	  exports	  to	  Mexico	  than	  do	  increased	  imports	  from	  China.	  	  
In	  September	  2010,	  the	  US	  Congress	  passed	  a	  bill	  calling	  for	  a	  10	  percent	  tariff	  surcharge	  on	  
Chinese	  made	  import	  exports.	  The	  Executive	  immediately	  matched	  this	  “bad	  cop”	  message	  from	  
Congress	  with	  a	  “good	  cop”	  message.	  In	  October	  2010,	  Treasury	  secretary	  Timothy	  Geithner	  noted	  that	  
“Our	  initial	  achievements	  [attaining	  global	  rebalancing]	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  undermined	  by	  the	  limited	  
extent	  of	  progress	  toward	  more	  domestic	  demand-­‐	  led	  growth	  in	  countries	  running	  external	  surpluses	  
and	  by	  the	  extent	  of	  foreign-­‐exchange	  intervention	  as	  countries	  with	  undervalued	  currencies	  lean	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against	  appreciation.”29	  The	  Chinese	  response	  was	  an	  oddly	  posed	  threat	  that	  reflected	  their	  weaker	  hand.	  
Prime	  Minister	  Wen	  Jiabao	  noted	  that	  a	  stronger	  renminbi	  might	  create	  social	  unrest	  in	  China:	  	  
“Do	  not	  work	  to	  pressurise	  us	  on	  the	  renminbi	  rate…	  	  Many	  of	  our	  exporting	  companies	  
would	  have	  to	  close	  down,	  migrant	  workers	  would	  have	  to	  return	  to	  their	  villages.	  If	  China	  saw	  
social	  and	  economic	  turbulence,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  for	  the	  world.”30	  	  
The	  positions	  here	  are	  asymmetrical.	  The	  United	  States	  stands	  to	  gain	  employment	  and	  growth	  from	  a	  
decline	  in	  Chinese	  exports,	  while	  China	  cannot	  gain	  from	  refusing	  to	  sell	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  or,	  as	  
noted	  above,	  doing	  what	  amounts	  to	  the	  same	  thing	  by	  declining	  to	  buy	  Treasury	  bonds.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank’s	  “QE2”	  plicy	  –	  quantitative	  easing	  of	  the	  monetary	  
supply	  by	  buying	  $600	  billion	  in	  assets	  using	  newly	  created	  cash	  –	  was	  a	  signal	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
would	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  exchange	  rate	  on	  its	  own	  if	  China	  did	  not	  cooperate.	  Just	  so	  the	  decision	  in	  
September	  2011	  to	  recycle	  FED	  receipts	  from	  its	  holding	  of	  MBS	  right	  back	  into	  more	  purchases	  of	  MBS,	  
and	  to	  push	  down	  the	  yield	  on	  long	  term	  Treasury	  bonds,	  signaled	  a	  determination	  to	  weaken	  the	  dollar.	  
China	  could	  do	  little	  by	  way	  of	  retaliation.	  Instead,	  these	  US	  moves	  simply	  magnify	  China’s	  internal	  
problems	  with	  inflation.	  The	  PBoC	  has	  attempted	  to	  damp	  down	  this	  inflation	  by	  raising	  reserve	  
requirements	  and	  the	  policy	  interest	  rate.	  But	  the	  renminbi’s	  undervaluation	  is	  now	  creating	  inexorable	  
pressure	  for	  revaluation,	  either	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy,	  or	  through	  the	  inflation	  driven	  re-­‐pricing	  of	  
Chinese	  production	  costs.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  if	  the	  change	  in	  the	  exchange	  rate	  will	  be	  gradual	  or	  
abrupt.	  
Meanwhile	  what	  of	  third	  parties?	  Third	  parties	  like	  Brazil,	  Japan,	  India,	  Thailand	  and	  Korea	  were	  
becoming	  increasingly	  irritated	  with	  China’s	  exchange	  rate	  policies	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.	  The	  most	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important	  of	  these	  is	  the	  European	  Union,	  which	  currently	  has	  a	  trade	  deficit	  with	  China	  that	  rivals	  that	  
of	  the	  US	  with	  China.	  Dynamics	  in	  Europe	  resemble	  those	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Trade	  deficits	  with	  China	  
aggravate	  the	  employment	  and	  growth	  problems	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis.	  The	  net	  
effects	  are	  the	  same:	  rising	  unemployment	  and	  thus	  rising	  protectionist	  pressures	  going	  forward.	  The	  
European	  Central	  Bank	  is	  committed	  to	  prioritizing	  inflation	  control	  over	  re-­‐establishing	  pre-­‐crisis	  levels	  
of	  growth	  and	  employment,	  which	  puts	  downward	  pressure	  on	  consumption,	  including	  imported	  
consumption.	  And	  the	  Eurozone	  crisis	  has	  caused	  the	  US	  dollar	  to	  rise	  relative	  to	  the	  euro,	  dragging	  the	  
renminbi	  with	  it,	  and	  thus	  also	  reduced	  European	  for	  Chinese	  exports.	  And	  if	  that	  is	  not	  enough,	  
European	  states	  are	  past	  masters	  at	  opaque	  forms	  of	  trade	  protection.	  
China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  are	  currently	  locked	  into	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  battle	  over	  jobs	  and	  economic	  
growth.	  Chinese	  exports	  are	  largely	  predicated	  on	  the	  current	  low	  value	  of	  the	  renminbi.	  To	  the	  extent	  
that	  past	  Chinese	  investment	  requires	  massive	  volumes	  of	  exports	  to	  validate	  the	  debt	  incurred	  making	  
that	  investment,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  Chinese	  growth	  requires	  exports	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  absorb	  its	  
labor	  overhang,	  Chinese	  growth	  is	  job	  displacing	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  particularly	  the	  United	  
States.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  efforts	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  re-­‐employ	  its	  nearly	  7	  million	  long	  term	  
unemployed	  necessarily	  involve	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  US	  trade	  deficit	  to	  more	  sustainable	  levels.	  That	  can	  
occur	  either	  through	  substitution	  of	  imports	  by	  local	  production	  or	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  imported	  
consumption.	  	  
As	  of	  2012,	  then,	  the	  central	  dilemma	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  was	  a	  choice	  between	  Chinese	  
inflation	  and	  US	  stagnation.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  who	  will	  bear	  the	  greater	  share	  of	  adjustment	  pain.	  
The	  current	  global	  economy	  very	  much	  resembles	  that	  of	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	  early	  1930s.	  At	  that	  time,	  
trade	  deficit	  countries	  found	  quick	  solutions	  to	  their	  employment	  difficulties	  by	  closing	  their	  borders	  to	  
flows	  of	  goods,	  people,	  and	  capital.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  both	  retain	  these	  options.	  China,	  by	  
contrast,	  is	  a	  trade	  surplus	  country	  and	  cannot	  afford	  to	  see	  trade	  wither	  away.	  In	  this	  conflict	  of	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interests,	  China’s	  holdings	  of	  dollar	  assets	  are	  not	  a	  source	  of	  power.	  However	  they	  might	  be	  part	  of	  a	  
relatively	  painless	  solution	  if	  they	  are	  spent	  wisely.	  The	  obvious	  solution	  to	  current	  global	  and	  domestic	  
imbalances,	  and	  the	  protectionist	  pressures	  they	  create,	  is	  for	  the	  Chinese	  state	  to	  shed	  part	  of	  its	  dollar	  
holdings	  by	  using	  them	  to	  buy	  American	  sourced	  goods	  that	  benefit	  Chinese	  consumers.	  The	  money	  is	  
there.	  What	  China	  lacks	  is	  political	  capital	  to	  make	  this	  happen.	  Like	  Japan,	  China	  seems	  destined	  to	  slide	  
into	  a	  financial	  crisis	  driven	  by	  its	  inability	  to	  shift	  income	  towards	  households	  and	  away	  fro	  politically	  
favored	  firms.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  co-­‐dependent	  US	  and	  Chinese	  economies	  are	  the	  same,	  except	  that	  the	  
United	  States	  has	  already	  had	  its	  crisis.	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